The Ancients, Augustine and Eudaimonia

Plato, Aristotle and Epictetus agree that the final good is a form of eudaimonia, a state in which one is “happy,” but not in the contemporary sense – eudaimonia is not a state of emotion or a feeling. For Plato, eudaimonia involves mutual harmony among the parts of the soul. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is essentially an activity, namely that which is virtuous and for Epictetus, it is a type of peace and tranquility obtained by the elimination of one’s false judgments that have arisen from strong emotions. Thus, we can say that for these ancient philosophers, eudaimonia is essentially a subjective good in general that does not specify a particular end. That is, attainment of eudaimonia involves changes in the agent that are aimed at a general conception of the good that is made specific by the individual. For instance, attainment of eudaimonia may involve very different paths: I may have to quell different desires with reason, perform different actions or eliminate different judgments than another although we both aim toward eudaimonia I general. In this sense, striving for eudaimonia gives one a broad end for action, but is essentially an instrumental good. By contrast, Augustine believes in a single final good for all obtained by relationship with the divine and obtained for its own sake.

Nietzsche: Power and Moral Value

A preliminary discussion of Nietzsche as an existentialist philosopher involves ideas about the general scope of his work in the context of existentialism in general, the concept of the will to power and some thoughts Nietzsche’s position on truth. Nietzsche’s “will to power” is a striking concept.  It involves a state of constant becoming, or more bluntly, a constant state of overcoming. It is the essence of life for Nietzsche and thus deserves to be discussed. The Nietzschian life revolves around “power” and the augmentation thereof, but what exactly is power? Power involves a surmounting or even involves control or influence over a particular external thing or internal phenomenon. Thus, if one were to act in order to “increase their will to power,” they would be acting to overcome something either in the world or in themselves that, if surmounted and overcome, will increase one’s control and influence over that thing. These general terms are confusing, so perhaps some examples will better serve to articulate the concept.

Hobbes’ Notion of Felicity from an Intentional Perspective

Felicity, as defined by Hobbes in his famous work Leviathan, is “continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering.” In general, this suggests that felicity is a continuous state defined by plateaus of success between stages of attaining, at least by his use of the word “continual.” Given the high value we attach to success, is felicity as defined by Hobbes an final good?

A working definition is required of us if we are to proceed with this question, so I propose the following: A final good is an end desirable for itself, that is, something that we desire only for its inherent qualities and are willing to peruse a range of means to realize. Can we desire purely for itself? If we were to do so, it seems that the desire for felicity cannot be similar in nature to the desire for a material object as an end, because such a desire would end as soon as any material object of desire is attained. Rather, if we are to consider felicity to be a final good for a particular agent, it would be best to define it as the desire for a certain type of experience or mental state associated with the attainment that is not fleeting or temporary. However, if the feeling of success itself is fleeting and felicity is the mental state associated with continual success, felicity cannot be a final good because it is not permanent. Our desire for felicity can be permanent, but felicity itself is at best, transient.

Vanity in Nietzsche’s “Beyond Good and Evil”

In section 261 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche articulates a conception of vanity with respect to the distinction he makes between nobles and ordinary men. He offers that vanity is perhaps the most difficult thing for the noble man to understand, for it involves seeking an opinion of oneself that is held by others and not oneself. Further, it involves thinking that this opinion is relevant and valuable, i.e. that it has a positive of negative effect on the self. Nietzsche goes as far as to say that in order to be vain, a noble would have to believe such an external opinion, which, given his articulation of the noble, seems impossible.