The Ancients, Augustine and Eudaimonia

Plato, Aristotle and Epictetus agree that the final good is a form of eudaimonia, a state in which one is “happy,” but not in the contemporary sense – eudaimonia is not a state of emotion or a feeling. For Plato, eudaimonia involves mutual harmony among the parts of the soul. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is essentially an activity, namely that which is virtuous and for Epictetus, it is a type of peace and tranquility obtained by the elimination of one’s false judgments that have arisen from strong emotions. Thus, we can say that for these ancient philosophers, eudaimonia is essentially a subjective good in general that does not specify a particular end. That is, attainment of eudaimonia involves changes in the agent that are aimed at a general conception of the good that is made specific by the individual. For instance, attainment of eudaimonia may involve very different paths: I may have to quell different desires with reason, perform different actions or eliminate different judgments than another although we both aim toward eudaimonia I general. In this sense, striving for eudaimonia gives one a broad end for action, but is essentially an instrumental good. By contrast, Augustine believes in a single final good for all obtained by relationship with the divine and obtained for its own sake. Continue reading →